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DISUNIFORMITY
Jason Rantanen and Lee Petherbridge, Ph.D.*
Abstract
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is a response
to a failure in judicial administration that produced a fractured, unworkable
patent law—one that Congress concluded ill-served entrepreneurship and
innovation. The purpose of the response—vesting exclusive jurisdiction for
patent appeals in the Federal Circuit—was to permit that court to develop
patent law in the direction of greater clarity and uniformity. Both at the
time of the Federal Circuit’s creation and again more recently, scholars,
judges, and practitioners have waged great debates over whether patent law
uniformity furthers the ultimate goals of entrepreneurship and innovation.
These debates have rested on a largely untested empirical proposition: That
the Federal Circuit’s patent law jurisprudence embodies a move towards
doctrinal uniformity. This Article reports an empirical study that examines
patent law uniformity through the measure of open decisional disagreement
between Federal Circuit judges. Its central empirical observation is a
remarkable increase in decisional disagreement—indicative of a decline in
doctrinal uniformity—among Federal Circuit judges over the past several
years. This Article raises and discusses several possible explanations for its
surprising observations, including, inter alia, the Supreme Court’s
influence and personnel changes at the Federal Circuit. It also considers
what the observations and explanations might contribute to a current
debate over the merits of Congress’s decision to unify patent jurisdiction in
the Federal Circuit.
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INTRODUCTION
Over thirty years ago, through the vehicle of the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982, Congress established the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit .1 Congress granted the court a broad swath
of subject matter jurisdiction,2 but the court is perhaps most famous for its
exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals whether arising from decisions
of the U.S. District Courts, the Court of Federal Claims, the International
Trade Commission, or the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.3
When it comes to patent law, Congress’s goal for the court is not
seriously disputed. In the time leading up to the creation of the Federal
Circuit, the United States faced “economic recession, high unemployment,
1. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.
(2012)).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012) (providing the court with jurisdiction over final decisions of the
United States Court of International Trade, final determinations of the United States International
Trade Commission, final decisions of the Merit Systems Protection Board, and final decisions of
agency boards of contract appeals). In addition to § 1295, Congress provided the court with
jurisdiction over appeals involving, inter alia, patents and trademark registration. Id. § 1338.
Congress also included tax refund claims, “any other civil action or claim against the United States,
not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or
any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United
States” and takings claims in the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction. Id. § 1346. Accord S. REP. NO. 97275, at 4 (1981) (“[T]he Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit provides such a forum for appeals
from throughout the country in areas of the law where Congress determines that there is special
need for national uniformity.”); id. at 6 (“The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will not be a
‘specialized court,’ as that term is normally used. The court’s jurisdiction will not be limited to one
type of case, or even to two or three types of cases. Rather, it will have a varied docket spanning a
broad range of legal issues and types of cases.”).
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295.
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mass layoffs of scientists and engineers, and extreme inflation.”4 Such
economic conditions encouraged the federal government to consider what
might be done to improve matters, and a Carter administration “Domestic
Policy Review” indicated that one policy approach to relieving the nation’s
economic “malaise” was to encourage innovation.5
When considering the impact of patent law (one of many policy tools
available to influence innovation), Congress was confronted with reports
indicating that the legal infrastructure of the patent system was in disarray.
Various reports, and testimony, for example, showed that patent law varied
dramatically depending upon the courtroom and circuit in which parties
found themselves.6 Other information demonstrated that the patent office
was “‘freelancing’ with respect to the standards of patentability,” thereby
encouraging a divergence between the legal frameworks applied by the
patent office and the courts to central questions of patent law.7 The picture
that emerged was one of an awkward legal infrastructure. The patent office
and its reviewing court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
developed and applied standards of patentability to decide whether patents
should validly issue, and the regional circuit courts developed and applied
their own different standards to determine whether a given patent had
validly issued.8 Congress, moreover, was informed that the Supreme Court
rarely stepped in to resolve inconsistencies in patent law, and might not be
well equipped to do so even if it were so inclined.9

4. Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit in Perspective, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 822 (2005).
5. Marion T. Bennett, The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—Origins,
in THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HISTORY 1982–1990 1, 8
(1991).
6. See Charles W. Adams, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: More Than a
National Patent Court, 49 MO. L. REV. 43, 55–57 (1984) (noting regional circuit variability in
standards for patentability); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1989) (noting that patents were “twice as likely to be
held valid and infringed in the Fifth Circuit than in the Seventh Circuit, and almost four times more
likely to be enforced in the Seventh Circuit than in the Second Circuit”); see, e.g., S. REP. NO. 97275, at 5 (reporting that “patent law [i]s an area in which the application of the law to the facts of a
case often produces different outcomes in different courtrooms in substantially similar cases”).
7. R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding?: An Empirical
Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1115 (2004).
8. See Dreyfuss, supra note 6, at 6 (explaining that the PTO was free to develop its own
standards for patentability, but could not impose those standards on Article III federal courts).
9. See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 3 (“The Supreme Court now appears to be operating at—or
close to—full capacity; therefore, in the future the Court cannot be expected to provide much more
guidance in legal issues than it now does.”); Adams, supra note 6, at 45 (noting the heavy workload
imposed on the Supreme Court that makes it difficult for the Court to resolve circuit conflicts);
Dreyfuss, supra note 6, at 6 (speculating that docket problems and a lack of expertise may
contribute to the lack of patent cases reviewed by the Supreme Court).
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Legislators were told that the resulting lack of uniformity in patent law
harmed innovation because it enhanced uncertainty about how the law
would treat the outputs of investment in technological entrepreneurship. If
uncertainty in the patent system could be lessened, it was argued,
investment returns would be more predictable and innovation would
increase.10
Thus, Congress’s goal for the Federal Circuit and patent law is founded
on a consistent and unambiguous11 line of reasoning: Vesting exclusive
jurisdiction for patent appeals in the Federal Circuit12 will permit that court
to develop patent law in the direction of greater clarity, uniformity, and
predictability in application.
It is thus somewhat surprising that a survey of the academic literature
indicates that relatively little attention13 has been paid to the question of
whether the Federal Circuit has succeeded in making patent law more

10. See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 6 (reporting testimony that stability in patent law has an effect
on innovation and that reducing uncertainty is important to business decision making).
11. It is not only context that informs this interpretation. The legislative history is full of
statements expressing Congress’s intentions with respect to the court. See id. at 5 (1981), reprinted
in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 15 (“[T]he Federal Circuit . . . provides a forum that will increase doctrinal
stability in the field of patent law.”); id. at 2 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 11–12
(stating that one purpose of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 is “to improve the
administration of the patent law by centralizing appeals in patent cases”); see id. at 6 (1981),
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 16 (stating a desire for doctrinal uniformity and stability in
patent law).
12. See id. at 7 (“Decisions of this court will have precedential effect throughout the
country . . . .”). But see Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 834
(2002) (returning jurisdiction over a subset of claims to the regional circuits), superseded by statute,
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(b), 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4) (2012)). The legislative history of Public Law No. 112-29 reiterated
Congress’s original goal in creating the Federal Circuit. H.R. REP. NO. 109-407, at 5 (2006). In an
early draft of the language that would become section 19(b), the House Judiciary Committee
remarked that it “believes Holmes Group contravened the will of Congress when it created the
Federal Circuit,” adding that “the Committee is concerned that the decision will lead to an erosion
in the uniformity or coherence in patent law that has been steadily building since the Circuit’s
creation in 1982.” Id.
13. There has been a small flourishing of literature recently mirroring somewhat the debates
surrounding the creation of the Federal Circuit and the weaknesses of uniformity. See Craig Allen
Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619,
1621 (2007); Lee Petherbridge, Patent Law Uniformity?, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 421, 455–57
(2009); see also Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437,
1465 (2012) (discussing the Federal Circuits jurisdiction over non-patent cases and how this may
prevent the court from developing expertise and thus consistency in its application of patent law);
Diane P. Wood, Keynote Address: Is It Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit’s Exclusive Jurisdiction
in Patent Cases?, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 1–2 (2014) (critiquing the need for a specialized
patent law appeals court). This is a topic to which we will return later as the empirical results we
present here relate directly to these issues. See infra Part III.
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uniform.14 The best available evidence on the question comes from a small
number of comprehensive empirical studies that address some fairly
ubiquitous patent doctrines. This evidence indicates that some central areas
of patent law still lack doctrinal uniformity.15
Another line of evidence that might point in the same direction—the
direction of incomplete uniformity—comes from a number of reversal (of
district court judgments) rate studies.16 These studies are of very
14. To be clear, by “uniformity,” we are referring to the straightforward idea that, as cases are
the law, the law is not uniform when judges divide over how they come out. This situation is further
amplified when, as is typical, judges can actually marshal cases to support competing views of what
the law is. On this point, a few commentators on an earlier draft suggested a more detailed
unpacking of the different conceptions that might embody uniformity. For purposes of this study,
however, we do not see an attempt to parse out concepts such as indeterminacy, predictability,
precision etc. as particularly helpful in explaining our findings or hypotheses given that in practice,
all of these concepts tend to be correlated with one another.
15. The claim construction doctrine addresses the interpretation of language that defines a
patent’s scope. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 7, at 1163 (finding evidence of competing
jurisprudential approaches to claim construction questions); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge,
Did Phillips Change Anything? Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction
Jurisprudence, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 134–35, 137–38, 148
(Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013) (showing that the different jurisprudential approaches to claim
construction questions continue to persist after Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (en banc), an opinion that addresses the doctrinal divide in the Federal Circuit’s approach to
claim construction issues). The doctrine of equivalents “determines whether an accused infringer’s
conduct, while not infringing the letter of a patent, may still be enjoined because it is close enough
to the letter of a patent.” Petherbridge, supra note 13, at 432, 457 (showing evidence consistent
with judge diversity in the application of the doctrine of equivalents). The inequitable conduct
doctrine, is designed to punish patent applicants who engage in inequitable behavior towards the
public while acquiring a patent. See Lee Petherbridge, et al., The Federal Circuit and Inequitable
Conduct: An Empirical Assessment, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1349 (2011) (showing evidence that
Federal Circuit judges may be applying stricter standards to inequitable conduct determinations
than the lower courts they are reviewing).
16. See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical,
Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 76–77
(2014) (arguing that although the Federal Circuit’s reversal rate of claim terms decreased between
2004 and 2011, the de novo standard of review applied to such cases ought to be narrowed to a
clearly erroneous standard in order to lead to more predictable results and more meaningful trial
court proceedings); Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim
Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1143 (2001) (finding “there is a trend showing
an increase in claim construction modifications and claim interpretation-based reversals” by the
Federal Circuit since 1998); Christopher A. Cotropia, Determining Uniformity Within the Federal
Circuit by Measuring Dissent and En Banc Review, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 801, 825 (2010)
(concluding that “the Federal Circuit . . . lacks uniformity in its thought on legal issues [and] fails to
use the en banc review process to resolve these disagreements” (emphasis added)); Kimberly A.
Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 38
(2001) (finding a “33% reversal rate of district court claim constructions” that “infuses the patent
system with a high degree of uncertainty until the Federal Circuit rules on claim construction”);
David L. Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1073, 1107 (2010) (arguing
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questionable usefulness, however, and it might not even be right to
interpret them as evidence concerning doctrinal uniformity. But because
we think such an interpretation might be suggested, at least when reversal
rate studies are taken in view of the comprehensive empirical studies
mentioned above, we give them some attention here.
Reversal rate studies have typically focused on just one patent law
doctrine, claim construction, and are usually interpreted as evidence of
relatively high reversal rates.17 If the reversal rates reported by these
studies are in fact “high,”—and it has never been properly shown that they
are—that could be consistent with a lack of doctrinal uniformity. The main
problem with interpreting reversal rate studies in the context of the
question of doctrinal uniformity is that the observed reversal rates might
have been observed even if the relevant doctrine were fairly uniform. An
underlying reason for this problem is a statistical error known as “selection
bias” that occurs when the sample chosen for observation is biased
somehow. Studies counting outcomes like “reversed” or “vacated” are
usually thought especially vulnerable to one type of selection bias,
selection for close cases, because if one assumes the legal process is
working efficiently, cases that reach a written judgment and written
decision on appeal might also be cases that present the closest questions
under the law. 18 They might therefore be expected to distribute fairly
evenly (or otherwise depending on a number of factors) between reversals
and affirmances. If efficiency factors encourage the selection of close
cases, reversal rate studies in isolation become difficult, if not
impenetrable, to interpret as meaningful to the issue of doctrinal
uniformity. A reversal rate of 50%, for example, might be found whether
or not a doctrine is uniform as long as the doctrine—again, whether
uniform or not—allows for some cases with outcomes that are difficult to
predict.19
Keeping this concern in mind, the comprehensive empirical studies
mentioned earlier are less vulnerable than reversal rate studies (although
not immune) to the effects of selection bias because they look directly at
the content of the jurisprudence or look at the judge-dependency of
that the best interpretation of currently available data is “that the claim construction reversal rate is
unduly high and has generally been increasing in the last fifteen years”).
17. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 16, at 1106 (discussing an article that finds reversal rates
for claim constructions cases as the highest among all appealed patent law issues); Wagner &
Petherbridge, supra note 7, at 1127 (noting two separate studies that found reversal rates of up to
50% for claim construction jurisprudence).
18. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 16, at 1101 (noting that “parties will settle all but the
closest cases”).
19. See id. (“Because claim construction is a central issue in a majority of appeals decisions
on the merits, such an approach suggests that claim construction appeals should be resolved with a
50 percent reversal rate.”).
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decisions. Since some of those comprehensive studies demonstrate that the
law of claim construction still lacks doctrinal uniformity,20 one might
expect that some component of the reversal rates observed in studies
looking at the Federal Circuit’s treatment of district court claim
constructions is a consequence of poor doctrinal uniformity as opposed to
selection bias.21 Reversal rate studies, on this interpretation, become
plausibly relevant to the question of doctrinal uniformity.
Unfortunately, for the purposes of easy analysis, another view of
selection bias complicates22 this interpretation. Under this alternative view,
high-appearing reversal rates for specific doctrinal issues might be more
likely to occur in the context of settled doctrine. The insight here is that
appellants are likely to direct an appeal toward those specific issues upon
which the district court clearly erred—i.e., judgments that are inconsistent
with established doctrine—rather than those that present closely contested
questions of law. Similarly, appellants are unlikely to appeal those issues
on which the district court ruled in a manner consistent with established
doctrine because there is a relatively low likelihood that they will prevail.
This leads to a somewhat counterintuitive correlation between doctrinal
uniformity and reversal rates: as doctrinal stability increases at the Federal
Circuit, one could expect a higher and higher rate of reversal for issues
involving settled doctrine as appellants shift their focus to other issues to
argue on appeal, except in circumstances in which the district court clearly
got it “wrong.”
If this second view is correct, or, perhaps operates at the same time as
the more consensus interpretation of selection basis set forth earlier, the
meaning of reversal rate studies to the question of doctrinal uniformity
becomes further muddled. Evidence from reversal rate studies is still
plausibly relevant to the question of doctrinal uniformity, but on the second
view, if reversal rate studies have, in fact, been observing “high” reversal
rates it suggests uniformity in claim construction doctrine, placing the
second view at odds with the evidence of the earlier mentioned empirical
studies that have directly observed a lack of uniformity in the law of claim
construction. As one attempts to resolve the conflict between evidence and
theory, one might plausibly conclude, counter to conventional wisdom, that
20. See supra note 15.
21. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 7, at 1144–45 (showing that district court
judgments exhibiting one doctrinal approach were often reversed by Federal Circuit panels taking a
different doctrinal approach). Further, if uniformity were present, at a minimum, some of those
cases studied would not have needed appeal.
22. Specifically, the view that selection bias for close calls does not necessarily apply to
individual issues in disputes, but rather there may be other factors driving selection of issues. See
Jason Rantanen, Why Priest-Klein Cannot Apply To Individual Issues In Patent Cases (Aug. 15,
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2132810.
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the reversal rates observed by reversal rate studies are not “high,” rather
they may be too “low” for a uniform doctrine. This view of claim
construction reversal rates has never been disproven and might turn out to
be correct, although the idea that claim construction reversal rates are too
low is presently a minority perspective. Our purpose here, of course, is not
to resolve theoretical issues about selection bias and claim construction
reversal rates; the point to be made is that it is very difficult to understand
how, in isolation, the evidence available from reversal rate studies applies
to the question of doctrinal uniformity. Indeed, it is quite possible that
observations of reversal rates might be unable to reveal anything of
significance about doctrinal uniformity.
Beyond the evidence that comes from research, legal scholars23 and
practitioners24 have also occasionally offered their subjective opinions on
the question using more traditional approaches to reporting. These writings
have tended toward the view that the Federal Circuit has improved the
uniformity of the patent law, although they sometimes express displeasure
with the content of the doctrine that has developed.25
An important measure of doctrinal uniformity not yet mentioned is the
extent to which judges disagree openly, viz. through separate writings in
judicial opinions, about the content of the law. Judicial disagreement over
23. See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Percolation, Uniformity, and Coherent Adjudication: The
Federal Circuit Experience, 66 SMU L. REV. 505, 539–40 (2013) [hereinafter Dreyfuss,
Percolation] (“[T]wo courts, hierarchically related, do not create the kind of interchange that is
necessary to produce optimal law.”); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit as an
Institution: What Ought We to Expect?, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 827, 833 (2010) [hereinafter Dreyfuss,
What Ought We Expect] (“At the end of the day, it is impossible to know from the data presented
whether the judges are generating a healthy number of diverse approaches to important new
questions in patent law or are simply being stubborn.”); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of
Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 827–28
(2008) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, In Search of] (noting that the Federal Circuit “has done less well in
using its expertise to keep patent law responsive to changing technological facts and emerging
national interests”); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in
Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 800–01 (2004) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, A Continuing
Experiment] (concluding that though the Federal Circuit has dramatically improved the patent
system, that there is still room for improvement in its operation). See generally Dreyfuss, supra note
6 (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of specialized courts, as well as its effect on formulating a
uniform system of law).
24. See, e.g., Donald R. Dunner, The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Its
Critical Role in the Revitalization of U.S. Patent Jurisprudence, Past, Present, and Future, 43 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 775, 782–83 (2010) (“The bottom line at the conclusion of the first quarter century of
the court’s existence is that the court has more than delighted its early proponents and surprised its
opponents with its high level of performance.”); Dreyfuss, A Continuing Experiment, supra note 23,
at 770–72 (reporting practitioner views).
25. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, Percolation, supra note 23, at 507–08 (suggesting that the Federal
Circuit has improved uniformity in the application of patent law but the process has been far from
perfect).
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the content of the law measures uniformity in both a symptomatic and a
causative fashion. Judicial disagreement is symptomatic of a lack of
uniformity because doctrinal variation permits and encourages judges to
read the law differently. Judicial disagreement is also causative of a lack of
uniformity because competing views about the content of the law leads to
competing precedents. These precedents can become crystallized, leading
to different flavors, standards, and sometimes even different rules within
the same legal doctrine.
Perhaps the most objective (and one of the most traditionally accepted)
way to measure judicial disagreement over the content of the law is to
measure separate writings. Measuring judicial disagreement over the
content of the law through separate writings can be imperfect depending on
one’s point of view. The main problem is that a judge might occasionally
author a separate writing even if the judge agrees with the majority’s
decision concerning the judgment under review. For example, a judge may
write a concurring opinion because he or she finds dispositive an issue the
majority does not (a procedural one perhaps), and might at least be said to
agree with the majority’s articulation of the law about the issue the
majority finds dispositive.26 One the other hand, as noted above, whether
this example is properly categorized as representing no disagreement about
the content of the law depends on one’s point of view about what the law
is. It might alternatively be said that the majority misapplied the law that
the concurring judge is highlighting, and so the concurring opinion does
reflect a difference in views about the content of the law. In any event,
these sorts of cases do not seem that common and so represent a relatively
small amount of separate opinion writings.
The more common examples are easier to acceptably categorize as
reflecting judicial disagreements about the content of the law. Dissents, for
example, tend to indicate a view that the majority misunderstood the law as
it applies to the judgment under review, and most concurrences also take
issue with a majority’s articulation and application of the law to a
judgment. In these scenarios, such separate writings fairly serve as a
measure of the extent to which judges disagree about the content of the
law.
Surprisingly (particularly in light of the degree to which uniformity is
so central to debates about the Federal Circuit), the extent to which judges
openly disagree—that is, show disagreement through separate writings—
about substantive issues of the patent law has been relatively unexplored.
Of the few studies reporting information about Federal Circuit judicial
26. For an extreme example, see DSU Medical Corporation v. JMS Company, 471 F.3d 1293,
1311 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Michel & Mayer, JJ., concurring) (showing that Judges Michel and Mayer
concurred, disagreeing merely with the belief that it was even necessary to resolve the issue in the
case en banc).
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disagreement, perhaps the most significant are from Lefstin, who studied
dissents at the Federal Circuit from 1983–2005, and Cotropia, who
compared the Federal Circuit to a selected set of regional circuits on the
measures of dissents and en banc reviews.27 Lefstin found patent litigation
before the district courts to be “significantly more indeterminate than most
other categories of cases reviewed by the Federal Circuit.”28 He also
observed that while the rate of dissent at the Federal Circuit in appeals
arising from district courts ranged from 1.41% to 13.27%, with an average
of 7.35%,29 the rate seemed to be experiencing a heightened level towards
the end of his study (2002–2005), leading him to call for further
investigation.30 Cotropia found that for the period from 1998–2009,
Federal Circuit judges on average tended to dissent in appeals generally
about as much or more often than their counterparts in other circuits and
dissented significantly more often when appeals involved patent law.31
In sum, the comprehensive empirical studies mentioned above that
directly examine written doctrine and judicial dependency provide what is,
presently, probably the best evidence concerning doctrinal uniformity. But
while these studies do address commonly confronted doctrines, and so are
quite informative, they do not address all aspects of patent law. This leaves
open the possibility that uniformity has been approached in other areas and
that perhaps a broader doctrinal assessment would paint a picture of
generally improved uniformity. Reversal rate studies, when viewed through
the lens of the empirical studies examining doctrine and judicial
dependency, might be suggestive of poor uniformity in at least one
doctrinal area (claim construction), but represent an even narrower sample
of the patent law than the doctrinal empirical studies. Moreover, as we
have just explained above, reversal rate studies might be meaningless to
the question of patent law doctrinal uniformity depending on how they are
affected by selection bias, a question that presently lacks a consensus
27. Jeffry A. Lefstin, The Measure of the Doubt: Dissent, Indeterminancy, and Interpretation
at the Federal Circuit, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1025, 1027, 1054 (2007); Cotropia, supra note 16, at 801;
see also Petherbridge, supra note 13, at 456 (collecting rates of separate writings (concurrences and
dissents) in Federal Circuit written opinions); Dennis Crouch, Dissenting in Patent Cases,
PATENTLYO.COM (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/02/dissenting-in-patentcases.html (collecting statistics on dissents in three-member-panel patent opinions with Westlaw
Headnotes released since January 1, 2000).
28. Lefstin, supra note 27, at 1089.
29. Id. at 1056.
30. Id. at 1090 (“Further study—perhaps investigating the influence of changes in court
personnel—would be necessary before crediting legal or structural factors for the current era of
dissent.”).
31. See Cotropia, supra note 16, at 815–16 (reporting that Federal Circuit judges dissented at
a rate of 3.51% compared to a range in other circuits of 1.14% to 4.56%, and dissented in patent
opinions 9.28% of the time over the period studied).
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answer.
Studies concerning open judicial disagreement offer researchers a
relatively unexplored perspective from which to observe doctrinal
uniformity. Lefstin’s and Cotropia’s studies represent a solid starting point,
but leave unanswered questions about the dynamics and mechanisms of
doctrinal uniformity. This Article addresses both these questions.
This Article reports an empirical study that examines patent law
uniformity through the measure of open decisional disagreement between
Federal Circuit judges. It is important to point out that our purpose here is
mainly descriptive, that is, we aim to observe and describe Federal Circuit
behaviors that relate to Congress’s fundamental goals for the institution.
The central empirical observation is a remarkable increase in decisional
disagreement among Federal Circuit judges over the past several years, an
observation we interpret as likely to reflect a decrease in doctrinal
uniformity. While this Article does not attempt to make any airtight
causative claims, it does discuss possible mechanisms that might explain
the observations, and, in some instances, relates them to broader ideas
about patent law uniformity and judicial decision-making.
What follows proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the study design
and methodology. Part II presents the data and considers possible
explanations for the observations. Part III considers what the observations
might contribute to a current debate over the merits of Congress’s decision
to unify patent jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit.
I. STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS
In order to examine the rate of agreement among Federal Circuit judges,
all Federal Circuit written opinions and Rule 36 dispositions (which have
no written opinion)32 in appeals arising from the district courts for a period
spanning October 13, 2004 to December 31, 2013 were collected from the

32. Under Federal Circuit Rule 36:
The court may enter a judgment of affirmance without opinion, citing this rule,
when it determines that any of the following conditions exist and an opinion
would have no precedential value:
(a) the judgment, decision, or order of the trial court appealed from is based on
findings that are not clearly erroneous;
(b) the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict is sufficient;
(c) the record supports summary judgment, directed verdict, or judgment on the
pleadings;
(d) the decision of an administrative agency warrants affirmance under the
standard of review in the statute authorizing the petition for review; or
(e) a judgment or decision has been entered without an error of law.
FED. CIR. R. 36, available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/rules-of-practice/rules.pdf
(last visited May 13, 2014).
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Federal Circuit’s website and reviewed.33 We focused on the set of appeals
arising from the district courts because the vast majority of these appeals
involve patent infringement suits.34 Out of concern that the data set might
be less complete for older time periods,35 samples from Westlaw were
checked against the dataset. This comparison indicated that while the
written opinions provided on the website appear to be complete beginning
in 2004, the Federal Circuit’s website did not contain any Rule 36
dispositions dated prior to July 11, 2007. Subsequent to that date, the Rule
36 dispositions were as complete as a sample taken from Westlaw.
Following collection, the opinions and Rule 36 dispositions were
reviewed and relevant data recorded. Collected data fields included case
identifying information, such as case name, date, etc., and decisional
content information as follows: whether the opinion was a Rule 36
disposition or a written opinion; whether the opinion was precedential or
nonprecedential; the degree of panel agreement (unanimous, majority, per
curiam); whether there were dissenting or concurring judges; the panel
members; and the authors of each majority, dissenting, or concurring
33. The Federal Circuit’s website states that it contains all of the court’s written opinions, “as
well as orders selected by the court.” See Opinions & Orders Search, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FED.
CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/opinions-orders/search/report.html (last visited July 8,
2014). The earliest opinion in an appeal arising from the district courts that was actually available
on the court’s website, however is On-Line Techs. v. Bodenseewerk Perkin-Elmer GMBH, 386
F.3d 1133 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/opinions-orders/0/12950/all/page2591-5.html (last visited July 8, 2014).
34. To be clear, our dataset encompasses the entire set of appeals arising from the district
court, not just those that involve issues typical to a patent infringement suit. There are instances
where the underlying dispute did not involve a patent infringement action. For example, an
applicant for a patent or trademark registration may appeal certain adverse decisions of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to either the Federal Circuit or the district courts. See
35 U.S.C. §§ 141, 145 (2012). In addition, issues unrelated to patent law (such as a contract dispute
or trademark infringement claim) might be properly appealed to the Federal Circuit if the
underlying suit involved a patent claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1); see, e.g., 3M Co. v. Mohan,
482 Fed. App’x. 574, 576–77 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (accepting jurisdiction over trademark infringement
appeal where, below, the plaintiff had also claimed patent infringement regarding the same facts and
circumstances). Due to the difficulty of drawing lines between issues that lie on the periphery of
patent cases, however, we opted to treat the entire dataset as one unit. That said, the overwhelming
majority of appeals in the dataset involved conventional issues of patent law and the dissents reflect
that the disagreement is over substantive issues of patent law. Cf. Jason Rantanen, Predicting En
Banc Issues, PATENTLYO.COM (June 13, 2012), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/06/whatwill-be-the-next-federal-circuit-en-banc-case.html (providing a graph of Federal Circuit dissents, by
subject matter, from June 2010 to June 2012, illustrating that most dissents in that period relate to
substantive issues).
35. Jason Rantanen, Recalibrating Our Empirical Understanding of Inequitable Conduct, 3
IP THEORY 98, 104 (2013) (explaining that as Westlaw’s database of court filings becomes more
complete each year, the results of studies that rely on court filing data for multiple years becomes
distorted because earlier years are not as fully reported on Westlaw as more recent years).
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opinion. A complete list of the relevant fields is provided at Appendix A.
The reliability of the data coder was assessed as follows: a subset of
approximately 10% of the dataset was coded by a second person, and an
intercoder agreement statistic, Cohen’s kappa,36 was calculated. In all
instances, the kappa value indicated almost perfect agreement between the
original coder and the second coder, indicating a high degree of intercoder
reliability.37 Data was analyzed via standard statistical techniques as
described in Part II.
II. THE RECENT MOVE TOWARDS DISUNIFORMITY AT THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT
Figure 1 shows the degree to which all panel members agreed in
precedential opinions, presented as a thirty-unit lagged average. While the
graph reflects only precedential written opinions, the general pattern it
shows is similar to that observed when all written opinions and Rule 36
dispositions are taken into account. In both cases there is generally greater
panel agreement (particularly with Rule 36 summary affirmance since they
are, by their nature, more likely to occur when panel members are
unanimous).

Figure 1 depicts a remarkable downward trend in decisional agreement
between Federal Circuit judges during the past several years. While the rate
36. Jacob Cohen, A Coefficient of Agreement for Nominal Scales, 20 EDUC. & PSYCHOL.
MEASUREMENT 37, 46 (1960) (discovering and presenting a formula to calculate “[a] coefficient of
interjudge agreement for nominal scales” that “is directly interpretable as the proportion of joint
judgments in which there is agreement, after chance agreement is excluded”); J. Richard Landis &
Gary G. Koch, The Measurement of Observer Agreement for Categorical Data, 33 BIOMETRICS
159, 164–65 (1977) (providing a chart which translates into plain language various ranges of value
for the “Kappa Statistic” when it is used to measure the strength of agreement between two data
scales).
37. The Cohen’s kappa for each manually coded field is provided in Appendix A.
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at which the Federal Circuit’s precedential opinions are unanimous
certainly exhibits some variation, the trend line suggests a more than 20%
drop in the rate at which panels were unanimous in precedential opinions
between the end of 2004 and the end of 2013.38

Figure 2 shows that dissents are an important component of the decline
in agreement, more forcefully suggesting that the downward trend in
decisional agreement reflects a genuine decrease in patent law doctrinal
uniformity. Although not quite as steep as the overall decline in unanimity
shown in Figure 1, the trend line in Figure 2 reflects a more than 10%
increase in the rate at which Federal Circuit judges dissent in precedential
opinions.39

38. The regression is significant at the p < 0.01 level. The study endpoints were October 13,
2004 and December 31, 2013. Both Figures 1 and 2 begin at the 30th precedential opinion, i.e., the
first lagged average. (Because the 30th opinion did not issue until 2005, the representation on chart
actually begins in 2005). Note that we are not suggesting that there is a gradual change over this
time period. Rather, we are simply observing that a change has occurred over time. Various
reviewers of an earlier draft of this Article noted that there appears to be a break point somewhere in
the 2009–2011 time period, a suggestion that is consistent with the explanations we offer later in
this Article. No reviewer, moreover, has seriously disputed that there appears to have been a change
in court behavior over the period studied. To the extent that some readers might find it more
empirically persuasive, we conducted a two period Chi-square analysis using January 1, 2010 as a
break point and found a statistically significant difference (at the p < 0.01 level) between the rate at
which panel opinions were unanimous before and after this cutoff. To be clear, we are not
suggesting that January 1, 2010 is the date of some significant event or point of inflection; the date
is merely an empirically informed, rough point in time useful for testing the idea that there has been
a change between the early portion of our study and the later portion.
39. The regression is significant at the p < 0.01 level. As with the rate at which panel opinions
were unanimous, a chi-square analysis of pre- and post-January 1, 2010 precedential opinions in our
study revealed a statistically significant difference at the p < 0.01 level.
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Viewed together, Figures 1 and 2 suggest that over the study period
Federal Circuit panels are formally disagreeing40 with increasing frequency
about the content of patent law. Indeed, at the extreme end, these data
become even more surprising. For a recent period in the dataset, the thirtyopinion lagged average was sitting at an astonishing 37% unanimity rate
for precedential opinions (Figure 1) while 43% of all precedential opinions
involved a dissent (Figure 2). In other words, the rate at which judges were
writing dissents had reached a point where it was higher than the rate at
which panels were unanimous in precedential opinions.
Taken by itself, this data41 suggests the possibility that Federal Circuit
patent law today is far from uniform. To the contrary, the data suggests a
high degree of dis-uniformity in the way Federal Circuit judges understand
and apply the patent law.
There are some fairly general issues concerning the central empirical
observation of this study that are worth dispensing with at the outset. We
begin by observing that the number of judges at the Federal Circuit has not
substantially changed during the period studied. To be sure, there have
been retirements, appointments, and moves to senior status (all of which
might play a role in our observations, as we shall later discuss), but the
number of Federal Circuit judges available to hear cases has not changed
much during the period studied.42
Another general concern might be that the number of dissents has been
altered by the Federal Circuit’s overall workload. Here, intuition is
consistent with literature that suggests an increase in workload should
produce a decrease in dissents, while a decrease in workload might
provoke an increase in dissents.43

40. These are changes over time that may have begun even before our study period. The rate
of dissents in all written opinions from the district courts that we observed in the years that our
study encompassed (2005–2013) ranged from 13.3% to 26.4%, while the rate of dissents in all
written opinions arising from the district courts from the period encompassed by Lefstin’s study
ranged from approximately 2% to 13%. See Lefstin, supra note 27, at 1056.
41. As noted above, the data pattern holds, although it moderates somewhat for obvious
reasons, when unpublished (but written) and Rule 36 summary affirmances are taken into account.
42. See infra Table 1.
43. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 32 (2008) (“Most judges do not like to
dissent . . . . Not only is it a bother and frays collegiality, and usually has no effect on the law, but it
also tends to magnify the significance of the majority opinion.” (footnote omitted)); Lee Epstein et
al., Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
101, 103–04 (2011) (arguing that “dissent rate is negatively correlated with caseload” because a
higher caseload means each dissent takes more effort to write and additionally garners more ill will
from the rest of the judicial panel).
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Figure 3, which depicts the number of appeals terminated by judges at
the Federal Circuit each financial year44 and the number of dissents written
that year, appears to show some modest variation that is not inconsistent
with a modest decline in dissent rates from 2006–2009 as terminations
increase. The pattern depicted for the period 2009–2013 does not reveal a
similar relationship. Taking the modest variation together with the
apparently inconsistent variation in more recent periods, we are inclined
toward the interpretation that Figure 3 does not provide good evidence that
the remarkable downward trend in Federal Circuit judicial agreement is
well explained as a consequence of the court’s overall workload.
Another similar concern is that the Federal Circuit has changed the
number of precedential opinions it writes, perhaps concentrating the
court’s precedential work product on a smaller number of important cases
more likely to trigger separate writings because of their significance.

44. The financial year for the Federal Circuit runs from October 1 of the preceding year to
September 30. See Statistics, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/thecourt/statistics.html (last visited July 8, 2014). For example, Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 ran from
October 2012 to September 2013. Id. Note that because the financial year ended shortly after the
end of our study period, the number of dissents for FY 2013 was actually one dissent higher than is
reflected in Figure 3.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss5/4

16

Rantanen and Petherbridge: Disuniformity

2014]

DISUNIFORMITY

2023

To examine this possibility, we looked at the number of precedential
opinions issued by the Federal Circuit during the period studied. While
Figure 445 does suggest a modest downward trend in numbers of
precedential opinions, we are inclined to the view that the data does not
reveal practically meaningful variation and note that in the years in which
the Federal Circuit had the most dissents (2012 and 2013) the numbers of
precedential opinions do not seem noticeably low. Figure 5 further
indicates that the number of dissents in precedential patent cases do not
seem to be particularly sensitive to the number of precedential patent
opinions the court authors in a year. It thus appears that changes in
precedential workload—possibly the most arduous form of judicial work
and the place where open judicial disagreement is most likely to
manifest—are not obviously an important driver of changes in judicial
disagreement.
45. Figures 4 and 5 reflect opinions on a calendar year basis.
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Finally, if there has been a workload change during the period studied,
it was for circuit judges probably in the direction of an increase. The reason
is that during the period studied, while the overall number of Federal
Circuit judges did not change much, the ratio of active to senior judges did
change. Table 1 shows that the ratio became smaller, viz. the Federal
Circuit added a few senior judges and lost one or two circuit judges
depending on the year considered.
Table 1: Active and Senior Judges at the Federal Circuit,
2005–201346
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

Active Judges
12
12
12
12
12
11
10
11
10

Senior Judges
3
3
4
4
4
5
6
5
5

Because senior judges tend to take on a reduced workload, the effect of
this development was probably to increase the workload of the active
judges. That being so, if the change in ratio of active to senior judges had
an effect on a trend in decisional agreement among Federal Circuit judges,
the literature, as noted above, suggests that effect would be to suppress,
rather than promote open judicial disagreement about doctrinal content.47
The figures just discussed reveal no evidence of such movement, and as
noted earlier suggest movement in the opposite direction.
In sum, the overall workload and precedential opinion output seems to
have been fairly consistent during the period studied, suggesting that
46. History of the Federal Judiciary, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/
hisj (last visited July 8, 2014) (providing individual profiles of federal judges and a database of
information on the federal judiciary). Numbers of judges were counted as of the beginning of each
year. For example, for 2010, eleven active judges (Mayer, Michel, Gajarsa, Linn, Bryson, Rader,
Newman, Lourie, Dyk, Prost, and Moore) and five senior judges (Archer, Plager, Clevenger, Schall,
and Friedman) were counted. Id.
47. See Epstein et al., supra note 43, at 103–04. We note that Epstein et al. offer a second
hypothesis, which is that frequency of dissent is positively related to circuit size because the fewer
the judges, the greater the collegiality costs of dissenting and therefore the fewer dissents. Id. at
102–03, 135. Our sense is that the variations in numbers of judges are probably much too small for
this to have a measurable impact here.
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meaningful explanations for the downward trend in decisional agreement
among Federal Circuit judges over the past several years may lie
elsewhere.
III. WHY MIGHT FEDERAL CIRCUIT OPINIONS EVIDENCE GREATER
JUDICIAL DISAGREEMENT?
The central empirical finding is evidence of a trend of increasing
judicial disagreement in patent cases at the Federal Circuit across the last
eight or so years. While the data underlying this study is not robust enough
to allow us to specify much in the way of an empirical explanation, we are
nonetheless able to do what law professors typically do: hypothesize about
what might be causing the apparent trend based on our knowledge of
events in the patent system and its judicial administration. This Part offers
several possible explanations for our observations, with the caution that
none of them are exclusive and that all might be working to some degree to
encourage the observed increase in judicial disagreement.
A. The Doctrinal Role of the Supreme Court
Perhaps the most obvious place to begin in trying to understand why the
Federal Circuit is exhibiting greater amounts of open judicial disagreement
is with the Supreme Court of the United States. We begin by outlining
three features of the Court’s patent jurisprudence that might help to explain
how it encourages greater levels of disagreement among Federal Circuit
judges.
The first is that the Supreme Court has been positively discouraging
doctrinal uniformity in patent law, and encouraging legal uncertainty. For
much of the first quarter-century of the Federal Circuit’s existence, the
Supreme Court was a relatively rare participant in patent law.48 When the
Court did intervene, it often did so with the express goal of helping the
Federal Circuit improve the uniformity of patent law. For example, in
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,49 the Supreme Court determined
that claim construction was a question for the judge and not for the jury, in
large part on the theory that such a decision would improve the uniformity
of the law.50 Similarly, in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.,51 the Supreme
Court was express in its desire to announce a rule of decision even clearer
48. This led one commentator to characterize the Federal Circuit as the “supreme court of
patents.” Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV.
387, 387 (2001).
49. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
50. Id. at 390.
51. 525 U.S. 55 (1998).
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and more uniform in application than the one the Federal Circuit had
developed.52
The Supreme Court’s patent jurisprudence has since undergone a
noticeable change, moving in the direction of less uniformity in patent
law.53 Perhaps one of the earliest examples of this is presented by Court’s
2002 decision in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.54
In Festo, the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s attempt to reduce
uncertainty in the application of the doctrine of equivalents through a
“complete bar” approach to prosecution history estoppel and replaced it
with a “flexible bar” approach.55 Another notable case is the Court’s 2006
decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C.56 By pretty much any
measure, eBay reduced the uniformity of application of remedies law to
patent cases, and encouraged judicial discretion in making remedy
decisions.57 A third example representative of the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudential change of heart is KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.58
That case, which addressed the doctrine of nonobviousness, made the
application of the law less uniform by rejecting the Federal Circuit’s
attempt to construct a uniform, evidence driven test for resolving
obviousness inquiries.59
The net effect of decisions like Festo, eBay, and KSR has been to
reduce the uniformity of patent doctrine and to increase the decisional
space available to judges hearing patent cases and patent appeals. This
additional judicial discretion permits Federal Circuit judges to indulge their
normative appetites more frequently than they would be able to under a
clearer, more uniform jurisprudence.60 The idea here can be nicely
52. See id. at 65–66 (“A rule that makes the timeliness of an application depend on the date
when an invention is ‘substantially complete’ seriously undermines the interest in
certainty . . . . Thus, petitioner’s argument calls into question the standard applied by the Court of
Appeals . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
53. Cf. Timothy R. Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Interest in Patent Law, 3 IP
THEORY 62, 77 (2013) (concluding that the Supreme Court is in an era of heightened interest in
patent law).
54. 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
55. Id. at 738–40; see also Holbrook, supra note 53, at 76 (discussing the Supreme Court’s
concern for the Federal Circuit’s preference for bright-line rules as demonstrated by the Festo
holding).
56. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
57. Id. at 394; see also Michael W. Carroll, Patent Injunctions and the Problem of Uniformity
Cost, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 421, 431 (2007) (describing MercExchange as the
Supreme Court rejecting the Federal Circuit’s uniform approach to granting injunctive relief).
58. 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
59. Id. at 415, 418.
60. Another possibility, suggested by one reviewer, is that perhaps when the Supreme Court
reduces the uniformity of patent law, it is actually increasing the discretion of district judges, which
should increase affirmance rates and at the same time reduce dissents, because there is less to
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introduced through the work of John Golden, who recognized that one of
the ways patent law may develop over time involves a sort of serial
resetting driven by Supreme Court participation.61 Even more important,
however, is his argument’s recognition that in many instances the Supreme
Court might not know what the correct uniform doctrine should be, and so
in reviewing patent cases might be careful to avoid specifying the law.62
Instead, the Court might remain content, in most cases, with resetting the
law—reopening decisional space by moving the law back from the detail
accumulated by the Federal Circuit’s copious case law—to a more general
statement or standard. Federal Circuit judges might then, less encumbered
by older case law, set about re-specifying through another several years or
decades of cases.63
A second reason why the Supreme Court may play a role in
encouraging open judicial disagreement among Federal Circuit judges is
that the Court has, by many accounts, been authoring decisions in patent
cases that might be either incoherent or reflect conflicting rules of decision.
Because the Federal Circuit is duty-bound to follow the Supreme Court, if
the Court’s various decisions now lead more often to competing outcome
choices, one might expect Federal Circuit judges to more often come into
conflict than they did when competing Supreme Court precedents were not
around (or if they existed in the past had been dealt with to the point that
the Federal Circuit had reached a common understanding of their role in
patent jurisprudence).
The subject matter eligibility cases sharply illustrate this explanation.
Since 2010, the Supreme Court has issued three opinions relating to 35
U.S.C. § 101.64 These opinions are—in a word—controversial, and are
subject to multiple interpretations. The one thing that scholars, judges, and
disagree about if the only question is whether the district judge abused his discretion. If that is true,
it makes our findings even more remarkable, because it suggests that the rate of dissent should be
lower following the cases discussed above, rather than higher.
61. John M. Golden, The Supreme Court As “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for
Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 674 (2009).
62. Id. at 686, 688.
63. A related point is that, as one commentator has observed, the Supreme Court’s resetting
of patent law may have produced a backlash at the Federal Circuit, in which the court applied a
hyper-interpretation of the Court’s precedent to reach a result that fits with its policy preferences.
See Lucas S. Osborn, Instrumentalism at the Federal Circuit, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 419, 419 (2012)
(arguing that “[t]he Federal Circuit hyper-interprets Supreme Court precedent out of a desire for
certainty and relatively outcome-determinative rules”). If this is the case, and one keeps in mind that
an appellate court is not a uniform body but is comprised of multiple judges each with their own
policy preferences, it would fit in nicely with our suggestion that something is going on in the
Federal Circuit itself. See infra Subsection III.C.3.
64. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3221 (2010); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc. (Myriad), 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013).
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practitioners are in agreement on is that these opinions create more legal
conflict than they resolve.65 This conflict has caused then-Chief Judge
Rader to repeatedly throw up his hands when faced with a subject matter
eligibility dispute. “Our opinions spend page after page revisiting our cases
and those of the Supreme Court, and still we continue to disagree
vigorously over what is or is not patentable subject matter. Indeed,
deciding what makes an idea ‘abstract’ is ‘reminiscent of the oenologists
trying to describe a new wine.’”66
A third reason the Supreme Court might have responsibility for the
increase in open judicial disagreement at the Federal Circuit ties the two
previous reasons together and adds a third: That the Supreme Court has
become more active in patent law during the period we studied than in
years past.67 And by more active, we mean that the Court has taken more
cases, written many more opinions, and in most of those opinions
disapproved of the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence.68 This reason thus
incorporates the first two reasons. Not only may the Court be resetting
patent law in specific areas and creating tensions between its precedents,
but the effect is amplified by the Supreme Court’s increased activity and
apparent discontent with the current substance of patent law. The Supreme
Court may, in effect, have been speeding up the rate at which it destroys
uniformity and introduces uncertainty into the patent law. The behavior of
Federal Circuit judges might reflect this higher pace of change.
65. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Edifying Thoughts of a Patent Watcher: The Nature of DNA, 60
UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 92, 97–102 (2013) (discussing Myriad’s various analyses and the
difficulty in determining whether products of nature are a patentable subject matter); Dan Burk, The
“Runcible” Product of Nature Doctrine, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 4, 2013, 3:50 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/the-runcible-product-of-nature-doctrine (noting how Bilski and
Mayo obfuscated the patentable subject matter analysis and also discussing how trial courts and the
Federal Circuit have struggled to apply the “products of nature” doctrine as a result); Dan. L. Burk,
Anticipating Patentable Subject Matter, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 109, 110–11 (Feb. 21, 2013),
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/articles/Burk_65_SLRO_109.pdf (arguing
that patent law’s novelty requirement has been mistakenly imported into subject matter
requirements).
66. Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1348 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (Rader, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp.,
672 F.3d 1250, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
67. Holbrook, supra note 53, at 64 (providing a graph illustrating Supreme Court activity in
patent, copyright, and trademark cases between 2000 and 2012).
68. Between 1982 and 2005, the Supreme Court issued approximately sixteen patent-related
opinions, an average of about two-thirds of an opinion a year. Between 2006 and the date of this
writing (December 31, 2013), it issued eighteen such opinions, an average of over two and one-half
opinions a year. Much of this activity has been concentrated in the last two years: since 2011, the
Court has issued ten patent-related opinions and is currently poised to issue at least three more this
term. See Supreme Court Patent Cases, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION, http://writtendescription.blogspot.
com/p/patents-scotus.html (last visited May 12, 2014). While this Article was in the editing process,
the Court issued another six opinions relating to patent law.
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B. The Signaling Role of the Supreme Court
A separate set of explanations for the observed increase in open judicial
disagreement at the Federal Circuit can be usefully thought of in terms of a
signaling role that the Supreme Court might be playing in patent law. This
set of explanations is foreshadowed by the last reason we gave in the
previous Section, particularly by the observation that much of the Supreme
Court’s recent and rapidly expanding patent jurisprudence appears to
express discontent with doctrine developed by the Federal Circuit. This
Section sketches out some of the signals the Supreme Court might be
sending with its recent blitzkrieg into patent law.
First, by reentering patent law jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has
signaled that it is taking at least some of the jurisprudential rein, perhaps
releasing some of the pressure Federal Circuit judges might feel to
maintain doctrinal uniformity. For nearly a quarter century Federal Circuit
judges were practically the sole guardians of Congress’s goal that patent
law develop and maintain greater uniformity.69 With the Supreme Court
apparently taking the jurisprudential reins, however, Federal Circuit judges
may be less concerned that their words will be the final words about the
content of the patent law. Other judges—Supreme Court justices—will
have the last word, resolving competing views and unifying the law. Such
a perception might discourage Federal Circuit judges from taking on the
costs of building consensus, or, alternatively, it might encourage Federal
Circuit judges to disagree with each other about the content of patent law.
This latter choice might be made under the view that by recording doctrinal
alternatives in their concurrences and dissents Federal Circuit judges will
be assisting the Supreme Court when it steps in to select the appropriate
doctrine.
A second explanation that might work cooperatively with the one just
laid out is that the reputational reward for writing a dissent has increased
since the Supreme Court has become more active in patent law. Here, we
draw upon the economic theory of judicial behavior developed by Richard
Posner.70 This model views the judge as a “rational, self-interested utility
maximizer.”71 In other words, judges are driven to maximize their own
personal utility. In its most simplified terms, this could mean that judges
are driven to maximize their leisure; but of course, maximization of leisure
69. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text (highlighting the pressures the Federal
Circuit might feel to maintain doctrinal uniformity).
70. See generally POSNER, supra note 43, at 36 (“Much of the strategic and even the
sociological theory of judging can be subsumed under the economic theory,” which focuses on how
a judge’s leisure preferences may impact her judicial utility, such as by encouraging settlement
before trial); Epstein et al., supra note 43, at 132 (explaining the economic theory of judicial
behavior and its relevancy to dissents and ideological heterogeneity).
71. POSNER, supra note 43, at 35.
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is hardly the only thing judges might derive utility from. Judges might, for
example, also derive utility from their judicial influence, whether from
having their ideas adopted by other judges or from instituting broader
reforms in the law.
Thus, one approach to understanding why judges do what they do is to
consider judicial choices in terms of costs and benefits. Here, we discuss
some relevant costs and benefits recognized by existing literature and
consider how shifts in the Supreme Court’s behavior might affect those
motivators of judicial behavior. On the one hand, there are two potentially
substantial costs associated with writing a dissent: (1) it involves effort
above and beyond that required for the job; and (2) it may cause the
dissenters to incur reputation costs among their colleagues.72 Generalizable
benefits on the other hand, tend to flow from the influence and enhanced
reputation that the judge derives from a dissenting opinion.73
If one accepts that appellate judges derive utility when they write an
opinion that is adopted or cited by others, and lose utility when they
expend energy without those views being adopted or cited (because the
effort and reputational costs outweigh the benefits from writing the
dissent),74 it could follow that an appellate judge who writes a dissent for a
disinterested Supreme Court may obtain little value from doing so. The
judge might as well be Sisyphus, pushing his rock up the hill and seeing it
roll back down. Better to join the majority opinion and try to get at least
some of the judge’s own views included in it.
That calculus could change in a way that fuels a rise in dissents when an
active Supreme Court enters the picture. Now, a dissenting judge has the
potential for a substantial reputational payoff: The Supreme Court might
grant certiorari and address, and perhaps even adopt a dissenting judge’s
position.75 Indeed, by dissenting the judge may make it more likely for the
Court to grant certiorari.76 Put another way, the presence of an active
72. See Epstein et al., supra note 43, at 103–04 (discussing the effort cost of writing a
dissent).
73. Id. at 104. We recognize that different judges will place different utility values on these
costs and benefits. Indeed, some judges may derive benefits simply from expressing their views,
much like an artist might derive a benefit from the act of creating. See POSNER, supra note 43, at 62.
In other words, we acknowledge that there may be variation among judges’ behavior. However, we
think that it is likely that most judges will be influenced, at least at the margins, by the costs and
benefits we describe.
74. An expectation consistent with Epstein et al., supra note 43, at 103–04, and, in these
authors’ view, with common sense as well.
75. An example of the Court adopting a dissenting judge’s opinion can be found in Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., in which Justice Thomas, writing for the Court,
largely adopted Judge Bryson’s dissent in the panel decision. 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2115, 2120 (2013).
76. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, What Ought We Expect?, supra note 23, at 840 (“One thing the
Federal Circuit has learned to do is to write dissents that attract Supreme Court review.”); Epstein et
al., supra note 43, at 128–29 (finding that the likelihood of a certiorari grant when a dissent has
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Supreme Court might encourage a positive feedback loop between dissents
and reputational rewards that was simply absent when the Supreme Court
rarely considered patent law. The consistency with which the Supreme
Court has been rejecting Federal Circuit case law that reflects a majority
consensus, moreover, might further fuel this mechanism.77 A judge who
finds utility in being recognized by the Supreme Court may (correctly)
perceive that he is more likely to obtain utility when the position he takes
is “against” Federal Circuit law.
Although this Section is about a role the Supreme Court might play in
encouraging disagreement between Federal Circuit judges about the
content of the law, it seems appropriate here to mention that the Supreme
Court is not the only audience for which Federal Circuit judges write. In
2011, Congress passed the America Invents Act, the “most significant
legislative event affecting patent law and practice in more than half a
century.”78 In doing so, Congress indicated that it, too, intends to play a
role in the continued development of the patent system. This adds yet
another audience—along with practitioners and academics—for Federal
Circuit judges’ opinions,79 and with it the possibility of even greater
rewards for a successful dissent.80
C. There is Something Going on at the Federal Circuit
An additional set of explanations for our observation that Federal
Circuit judges are increasingly in disagreement about the content of patent
been written is statistically significantly higher than in the absence of dissent); Holbrook, supra
note 53, at 69–70 (commenting that intra-circuit splits at the Federal Circuit can send a signal to the
Supreme Court).
77. See, e.g., Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070–71 (2011)
(criticizing the Federal Circuit’s application of the proper willful blindness standard); Bilski v.
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (“[N]othing in today’s opinion should be read as endorsing
interpretations of § 101 that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has used in the past.”);
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 422 (2007) (“What we hold is that the fundamental
misunderstandings identified above led the Court of Appeals in this case to apply a test inconsistent
with our patent law decisions.”).
78. Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Toward a System of Invention Registration: The
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 24, 24 (2011).
79. See also Mark D. Janis and Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97 MINN. L.
REV. 72, 86 (2012) (suggesting that the audience for patent law has changed dramatically from the
past). Indeed, patent law as a field has become more prominent as a result of broad social and
economic trends. As Tun-Jen Chiang personally commented to us, this may increase both the
external utility—writing for an audience with the intention of producing a change—and internal
utility—the opportunity to voice opinions on issues the judges personally care about—of writing a
dissent.
80. See, e.g., Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336,
1346 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Rader, C.J., dissenting); cf. Randall R. Rader, The State of Patent Litigation,
21 FED. CIR. B.J. 331, 334–35 (2011) (proposing six reforms to patent litigation).
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law might be found within the Federal Circuit itself. This Section outlines
how possible developments at the Federal Circuit might play a role, at least
in part, in reducing doctrinal uniformity. As before, the reasons we develop
here are not exclusive and one or more could cooperate to explain our
observations.
1. The Role of New Federal Circuit Judges
During the period studied, the Federal Circuit underwent an arguably
unprecedented turnover of judges. Since 2009, the court has experienced a
50% turnover among active judges.81 The turnover among senior judges
has been even more dramatic.82 Without question, the composition of the
court by 2013 had become very different from its composition in 2009, let
alone 2006. Might the addition of new judges encourage a decrease in the
uniformity of patent law?
There is very little literature exploring whether the arrival of new
judges has an impact on doctrinal uniformity, and what there is might lead
in different directions. Perhaps the most on point work—since it addresses
the Federal Circuit—is that of Wagner and Petherbridge.83 Based on
empirical evidence from judicial opinions, their work suggests that (then)
new Judges Dyk and Linn were disruptive forces in Federal Circuit
jurisprudence; in particular, that they were largely responsible for pushing
the proceduralist agenda in the court’s claim construction jurisprudence.84
Given this precedent, perhaps part of an explanation for the observation
that patent law doctrine appears increasingly disuniform is that a set of new
judges with different views of the law than older Federal Circuit judges
have arrived at the Federal Circuit.
This interpretation stands in some contrast to other work, not directly
concerned with the Federal Circuit but concerned nonetheless with new
appellate judges, that suggests that new judges are less likely to author
dissenting opinions than experienced judges. The idea behind this
suggestion has been labeled the “freshman effect,” and emphasizes the
notion that new judges are less likely to write majority or dissenting
opinions than their more experienced colleagues due to the need to
81. Judges Schall, Mayer, Linn, and Bryson took senior status and Judges Gajarsa and Michel
retired from the court altogether. Judge Gajarsa initially took senior status before retiring from
service in 2012. Those six vacancies, of a total of twelve judgeships, were filled by Judges
O’Malley, Reyna, Wallach, Taranto, Chen, and Hughes. For more information on judicial
nominations and vacancies, see JUDICIALNOMINATIONS.COM, http://www.judicialnominations.org/
(last visited May 12, 2014).
82. With the exception of Judge Plager, the set of senior judges at the end of our period
studied was completely different form the set of senior judges at the beginning of our period
studied.
83. See Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 7, at 1153.
84. Id.
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acclimate to their new environment.85 A predication based on this literature
is that the new judges on the Federal Circuit are less likely to dissent from
their colleagues, at least during an initial acclimatization period.86
Figure 6 shows the twenty-unit lagged averages of separate opinion
authorship in precedential decisions by each judge who joined the court
during our study period and for whom we had sufficient data.87 Although
the data is limited, it does not seem consistent with a “freshman effect.”

Indeed, Figure 6 might even suggest the opposite of a “freshman
effect”: that these three judges wrote dissents and concurrences at a
relatively high individual rate during their initial “acclimation” period.88
Given these results, perhaps it is the case new judges writing more
dissenting opinions than expected (a number of dissents that might have
been even higher if there is a freshman effect at work) explains, at least in
part, our observations.
Additionally, there is some literature suggesting that new judges can be
disruptive even if they are not writing the separate opinions themselves. 89
85. See Hettinger et al., Acclimation Effects and Separate Opinion Writing in the U.S. Courts
of Appeals, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 792, 793 (2003) (finding empirical support for the hypotheses that new
appellate judges are less likely to author dissenting opinions).
86. For example, Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek used a 2-year cutoff to test their
hypothesis about the freshman effect. Id. at 796.
87. Thus, Judges Wallach, Taranto, and Chen were not included because there was
insufficient data for those judges. Figure 6 represents the rate at which each listed judge wrote a
second opinion (dissent, concurrence, or both) in connection with a precedential opinion for which
they were a panel judge.
88. Judge Moore had been on the court for over 2 years by point 34 on Figure 6, Judge
O’Malley by point 35, and Judge Reyna by point 36.
89. See Scott P. Johnson & Christopher E. Smith, David Souter’s First Term on the Supreme
Court: The Impact of a New Justice, 75 JUDICATURE 238, 243 (1992) (concluding that even though
he did not author many important opinions, he nevertheless exercised significant influence over
important issues during his initial term merely through his presence and participation).
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Indeed, we observe from a comparison of Figures 2 and 6 that the rate of
separate opinion authorship by these three judges individually does not
approach the dissent (alone) rate of the court as a whole, suggesting that
there may be other factors at play. Therefore, it is possible that the addition
of new judges to the Federal Circuit has encouraged a decrease in doctrinal
uniformity through a mechanism that involves, perhaps, their very presence
and participation in cases. This strand of the literature ties in nicely with
the next Subsection, because the role for senior judges might well involve
a reaction to the presence, participation, and opinion writing of new judges.
2. A Role for Senior Judges
As noted earlier, there is presently little evidence that the absolute
number of Federal Circuit judges and the court’s overall workload are
sufficient to explain the decline in uniformity we observed. Earlier,
however, we did note that “retirements, appointments, and moves to senior
status” might inform an explanation.90 The data presented earlier also point
out that there might be a correlation between the observed increase in
dissents and the substantial increase in senior judges relative to active
circuit judges—many of whom are new judges.91 Here, we introduce the
idea that senior judges might play a role as caretakers of the circuit law,
and in the case of the Federal Circuit, perhaps as caretakers of an
institution, which could, under conditions that might be present, lead to the
apparent decrease in doctrinal uniformity reported in this study. 92
The idea is informed by a number of factors, and in the end provides a
mostly circumstantial, but reasonably plausible case that is open to future
empirical testing. At the outset, however, it is important to understand our
use of the the term “senior judges.” Earlier in this Article, where we
present empirical data about the Federal Circuit’s workload, we use the
term senior judges to refer to those Federal Circuit judges that have taken
senior status.93 By contrast, when we use the term senior judges in this
Subsection, the term is used in two ways. First, the term refers to judges
who have accumulated considerable seniority: those of long tenure on the
Federal Circuit, whether or not they have elected to take senior status.

90. Supra text accompanying note 42.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 46–47.
92. Surprisingly, while it is well established that senior judges may have different attributes
from active judges (especially junior judges), there appears to be relatively little in the literature
about how these differences might manifest in terms of judicial behavior. Cf. Erin B. Kaheny et al.,
Change over Tenure: Voting, Variance, and Decision Making on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 52
AM. J. POL. SCI. 490, 493 n.3 (2008) (noting that “[r]elatively few judicial studies exist to guide
expectations about senior judges”).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 46–47.
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Examples would include Judges Lourie and Newman,94 and could include
long tenured judges that recently retired rather than take senior status.
Second, where relevant, the term, as used earlier, can also mean judges
who have taken senior status. These judges not only have long Federal
Circuit tenures, but might in some circumstances experience cost and
benefit possibilities different from the first category of senior judges. Much
but not all of the discussion in this Subsection is relevant to both meanings
of “senior judge.” Fortunately, it tends to be obvious from the discussion
when one form of senior judge is likely more relevant than another.
To begin with, it would seem to often be the case that senior judges are
walking around with a lot more circuit law in their heads than new judges.
Indeed, senior judges may have grappled with the precedent being applied
in a case on several occasions. Thus, as a basic matter, senior judges may
simply know the law better than brand new appellate judges. This might
make it easier for senior judges to spot weaknesses, limitations, and errors
in the use of precedents and arguments advanced by new judges.
The doctrinal knowledge advantage of senior judges might be further
amplified by the fact that patent law is a notoriously difficult subject.95
Thus, not only might the gap in doctrinal knowledge and nuance between a
highly experienced senior judge and a new judge be vast, new judges might
also sometimes be operating with very difficult, unfamiliar law in the fog
of vigorous advocacy. Taken together, these factors might lead a new judge
to overlook or perhaps misinterpret relevant circuit law while such errors
might be immediately apparent to an experienced senior judge.
Senior judges, moreover, may not have only grappled with the
precedent being applied on previous occasions, they may have even voted
in the cases giving rise to the precedent or authored some of the opinions.
They might therefore have a belief about what the court was trying to
communicate in the opinion—for example, what interpretations the court
was attempting to leave open or foreclose by the language it selected—and
might desire to see that new judges applying the precedent get it “right.”
Senior judges on the Federal Circuit might also be “uniformity hawks.”
Many of the senior judges on the court witnessed its creation, and many
others were appointed during the era when Congress’s views about
uniformity in the patent law were widely known and embraced.96 These
94. Judge Lourie was confirmed in 1990, and Judge Newman was confirmed in 1984. See
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, JUDICIALNOMINATIONS.ORG (last visited May 14, 2014),
http://judicialnominations.org/.
95. See, e.g., Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 599 F.2d 685, 706 (5th Cir. 1979)
aff’d, 448 U.S. 176 (1980) (“Mr. Giles S. Rich observed on several occasions during the hearings
on section 271 that patent law is ‘the metaphysics’ of the law and that contributory
infringement/patent misuse issues are the metaphysics of patent law.”).
96. Cotropia, supra note 16, at 806 (detailing Congress’s establishment of and vision for the
Federal Circuit).
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judges may themselves have embraced the philosophy, perhaps stated as:
as long as the rules choices are reasonable, it may be more important to
have clear and uniform rules than it is to have any particular rule. If some
senior judges are of the view that new judges are authoring opinions that
disturb a uniformity they labored and compromised to create—for
example, by authoring an opinion inconsistent with an older precedent—
they might be motivated to dissent on the theory that the dissent will call
attention to the departure, or that the dissent might help preserve the older
precedent.
Judges that have taken senior status also probably have more
opportunities to dissent, because as noted earlier they tend to carry a
smaller workload.97 Thus, not only might senior judges have vastly more
circuit law at their fingertips than new judges, the opportunity cost
(resources lost to other cases or other activities if a dissent is undertaken)98
for choosing to write a dissent might be lower99 for senior judges.100 The
reputational cost of dissent too—especially if that dissent is directed to a
new judge with whom a senior judge might expect to rarely sit—might also
be expected to be lower for senior judges than for circuit judges. Therefore,
if a senior judge wants to take on the role of teacher and doctrinal guardian,
cost considerations might encourage her to do so.
Taken together, there is a case to made for the idea that senior judges—
or at least very experienced judges if not technically senior—might occupy
the role of teacher, and caretaker of the circuit law in a manner that might,
as a reaction to a large influx of new judges, manifest as the apparent
decrease in doctrinal uniformity reported in this study. Unfortunately, this
possibility highlights an area where further empirical research is needed.
One might, for example, examine whether judges’ behavior in terms of
dissents changes when they assume senior status or varies by a judge’s
original appointment year. The dataset used in this study, however,
provides only two such substantive before and after comparisons and

97. Senior judges can fulfill their obligations by carrying a caseload “which is equal to or
greater than the amount of work involving courtroom participation which an average judge in active
service would perform in three months.” 28 U.S.C. § 371(e)(1)(A) (2012).
98. See Albert Yoon, As You Like It: Senior Federal Judges and the Political Economy of
Judicial Tenure, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDS. 495, 533 (2005) (reporting a comment from a senior
judge that taking senior status allowed “more time for reflection on the cases undertaken, less
frustration in trying to keep up and more peace of mind”).
99. Whether it would be lower depends of course on what other things the senior judge is up
to, for example, the extent to which a senior judge might increase his or her leisure.
100. Cf. Epstein et al., supra note 43, at 129 (noting that “[a] greater number of judges lowers
the collegiality cost of dissenting, [and] a lighter workload lowers the opportunity cost of
dissenting”).
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accordingly sheds little light on the validity of this idea.101 Future work,
however, will also have to account for the possibility that senior judges
have a causal impact on the court’s separate writing rate, even if it is not
senior judges authoring the opinions.102 One means of exploring this
possibility might involve investigating the impact of panel composition on
dissents.
3. A Decline in Judicial Collegiality
In The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, Judge Harry
T. Edwards of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
wrote that “collegiality plays an important part in mitigating the role of
partisan politics and personal ideology by allowing judges of differing
perspectives and philosophies to communicate with, listen to, and
ultimately influence one another in constructive and law-abiding ways.”103
Collegiality is not homogeneity or conformity; rather, what Judge Edwards
was referring to was the idea that judges “are willing to listen, persuade,
and be persuaded, in an atmosphere of civility and respect.”104 This
collegiality is important: “The more collegial the court, the more likely it is
that the cases that come before it will be determined solely on their legal
merits,” 105 as opposed to the judges’ personal preferences.
One real possibility is that our observations might be explained by a
breakdown in judicial collegiality at the Federal Circuit.106 Here, we refer
not to the idea that members of the court may have differing ideological
preferences, but rather that a lower level of collegiality has caused those
preferences to drive the courts’ opinions.
Central to these observations is the increase in dissents noted above.
While dissenting opinions can be healthy for a court, too many dissents
may suggest that judges on the court are simply talking past each other. In
his work on collegiality, Judge Edwards—himself an insider at a court not

101. For Judge Schall, his rate of dissents stayed approximately the same at 8%, but for Judge
Mayer, his rate of dissents drastically increased from 12% to 39%.
102. For example, not including judges having taken senior status, it is the senior active panel
judge that decides opinion authorship, a factor that might be involved in stimulating separate
writings by newer judges.
103. Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L.
REV. 1639, 1645 (2003).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Cf. Lefstin, supra note 27, at 1090 (hypothesizing that perhaps the era of elevated dissent
he observed beginning in 2002 “could mark either an increase in the indeterminacy of legal
questions considered by the circuit or a breakdown in the structural constraints that tended to
suppress dissent in the decade preceding”).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

31

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 5 [2015], Art. 4

2038

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

all that different structurally than the Federal Circuit107—wrote that:
In an uncollegial environment, divergent views among
members of a court often end up as dissenting opinions. Why?
Because judges tend to follow a “party line” and adopt
unalterable positions on the issues before them. This is
especially true in the hard and very hard cases that involve
highly controversial issues. Judges who initially hold different
views tend not to think hard about the quality of the
arguments made by those with whom they disagree, so no
serious attempt is made to find common ground. Judicial
divisions are sharp and firm. And sharp divisions on hard and
very hard issues give rise to “ideological camps” among
judges, which in turn beget divisions in cases that are not very
difficult. It is not a good situation.108
Even without the empirical metrics reported in this Article, it is easy to
see a reflection of the current Federal Circuit in Judge Edwards’
description of the hypothetical “uncollegial” court. As an illustration,
consider the chasms that run through the court’s recent jurisprudence on
subject matter eligibility.109 One need examine only a handful of these
opinions to recognize that the judges are simply not talking to each other in
their opinions. Instead, they appear to be battling for positions within the
court of public opinion.110

107. For references comparing the twelve regional circuit courts of appeal to the Federal
Circuit, see S. Jay Plager, The United States Courts of Appeals, The Federal Circuit, and the NonRegional Subject Matter Concept: Reflections on the Search for a Model, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 853,
854–55 (1990); John M. Golden, The Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit: Comparative Trials of
Two Semi-Specialized Courts, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553, 573–74 (2010) (comparing the D.C.
Circuit to the Federal Circuit and concluding that lessons learned from the D.C. circuit may extend
to the Federal Circuit particularly in regard to Supreme Court involvement).
108. A Conversation with Judge Harry T. Edwards, 16 WASH U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 66 (2004).
109. See, e.g., Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, L.L.C., 722 F.3d 1335, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2013); id. at
1354 (Lourie, J., concurring) (responding to the majority opinion, authored by Chief Judge Rader);
Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1337 (Fed. Cir.
2013); id. at 1346 (Rader, C.J., dissenting) (responding to the majority opinion, authored by Judge
Lourie).
110. See, e.g., Accenture Global Servs., 728 F.3d at 1346, 1348 (Rader, C.J., dissenting)
(expressing annoyance with frequent disagreement and confusion among the judges); Apple Inc., v.
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 725 F.3d 1356, 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Reyna, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (highlighting the impact of smartphones, the benefits of a touch screen, and
Apples’ innovation in developing a touch screen that should not be considered an infringement of
prior art inventors). Some commentators have suggested that we might also consider a failure of
leadership at the court. While we, again, are not in a position to have first-hand knowledge of this
issue at the court, there are suggestions of at least some tensions within the court related to the issue
of leadership. See Dan Levine, Insight: Rocker Judge Juggles Tech Policy, Supreme Court and the
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If collegiality between Federal Circuit judges has diminished—and we
reiterate that we are not in a position to offer first-hand knowledge about
whether this is the case111—then the court may have trouble resolving
some of the most challenging issues it faces in a meaningful way unless
and until that collegiality returns. We might also expect more fractured
opinions representative of a deeply divided court such as the multiple
opinions in CLS Bank International v. Alice Corp.,112 which produced a
legal framework that at least one judge on the court seems to think is
binding precedent and at least one judge thinks has no precedential effect
at all.113
4. A Shift in Appellate Philosophy
Another phenomenon our observations might be detecting is that the
Federal Circuit is changing its appellate philosophy. This explanation fits
nicely with the presence of new judges, who one might classify as
philosophical movers. But this explanation serves just as well if new
judges have nothing to do with it. In the Introduction we explained how the
Federal Circuit is a response to a failure in judicial administration that had
produced a fractured patent law. The purpose of vesting exclusive
jurisdiction for patent appeals in the Federal Circuit was to permit that
court to develop patent law in the direction of greater clarity, uniformity,
and predictability in application.114 By many accounts, the appellate
philosophy evinced by Congress’s creation of the Federal Circuit found a
home in early Federal Circuit jurisprudence.115

Stones, REUTERS (Dec. 11, 2013, 9:22 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/11/us-usajudge-rader-insight-idUSBRE9BA06D20131211.
111. Although we are not in a position to have first-hand knowledge about the internal
operation of the court, we would be remiss in not acknowledging the substantial discussion
following Judge Rader’s resignation, first from his position as Chief Judge and then from the court
entirely. See, e.g., Ashby Jones, Critics Fault Court’s Grip on Appeals for Patents, WALL ST. J.
(July 6, 2014), available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/critics-fault-courts-grip-on-appeals-forpatents-1404688219 (describing dissatisfaction with the Federal Circuit); Warren Woessner, Gone
Judge—Judge Randall Rader to Resign, THE NAT’L L.R. (June 16, 2014),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/gone-judge-judge-randall-rader-to-resign (detailing Judge
Rader’s resignation).
112. 685 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc), vacated, 484 Fed. App’x 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
113. Compare Accenture Global Servs., 728 F.3d at 1341, with id. at 1346–47 (Rader, C.J.,
dissenting).
114. Cotropia, supra note 16, at 806 (detailing Congress’s establishment of and vision for the
Federal Circuit).
115. Cf. id. (“One of the critiques related to the Federal Circuit is that Congress was, in a way,
too successful—the Federal Circuit creates too much uniformity in patent law.”).
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Perhaps the observations of this study are detecting a change in that
appellate philosophy. Perhaps the Federal Circuit is itself116 abandoning
Congress’s goal of a clear and uniform patent law in favor of what it thinks
is a “better” more contextually sensitive case-customized patent law. Such
a development might, for obvious reasons lead to the observations reported
in this Article.
IV. WHAT ABOUT UNIFORMITY?
In this Part, we consider the larger picture of what our findings might be
uncovering about the role of the various branches of government in the
patent system. We highlight two main ideas. First, that some combination
of the Supreme Court, Executive Branch, and perhaps some Federal Circuit
judges may be working cooperatively to undermine Congress’s goal for the
Federal Circuit. Second, that our observations might explain how subject
matter-bounded courts work.
A. The Undoing of Congress’s Intent
A larger picture that might be emerging from the analysis of this data is
one in which the Supreme Court and the Executive Branch have been
cooperating to undermine Congress’s goal for the Federal Circuit—that is,
a uniform patent law, reasonably predictable in application. To begin with,
when we say “undermine Congress’s goal for the Federal Circuit,” we are
not announcing a conspiracy theory or some sort of centrally-managed
artifice or scheme. We have something much more descriptive and
mundane in mind: That actors capable of influencing the development of
patent law—in particular, the Supreme Court and the Executive Branch
(outside of the patent office)117—are working on patent law and may have
goals that do not emphasize doctrinal uniformity.
We have already described a possible role for the Supreme Court, both
in terms of the content of its patent doctrine and its influence.118 What has
not been highlighted so far is the role of the Executive Branch, particularly
through the agency of the Solicitor General. It turns out that there is an
association between the Supreme Court and the Executive Branch—via the
116. Or at least some judges are, which would lead to the same result. This particular split is
particularly evident in the en banc court’s fractured opinion in Lighting Ballast Control LLC v.
Philips Electronics N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc). In that case, Judge
Newman’s majority opinion relied heavily on principles of uniformity. Id. at 1276–77. In contrast,
Judge O’Malley’s dissent drew strongly on principles of deference. Id. at 1296 (O’Malley, J.,
dissenting).
117. Arti Rai, for example, has documented non patent office executive branch intervention in
patent law. Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations for
Policy Development, 61 DUKE L. J. 1237, 1240–41 (2012).
118. See supra Sections III.A.–B.
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Solicitor General—capable of playing a role in reducing the uniformity and
predictability of patent law. The association involves the Solicitor’s role in:
(1) advising the Supreme Court about which patent cases to hear; and (2)
advocating for a particular view of the law in the cases it advises the
Supreme Court to hear. It is well known that the Supreme Court holds the
Solicitor’s office in high regard, and it is common in patent cases for the
court to follow the Solicitor’s recommendations.119 The Solicitor thus
bears some responsibility, along with the Supreme Court, for the quality
and content of Supreme Court patent jurisprudence.
B. Uniformity and Subject Matter-Bound Courts?
Combining the mechanism just described with the evident decrease in
patent law uniformity suggests the possibility that the Supreme Court and
the Executive Branch are cooperating to undermine Congress’s goals for
the patent law. If true, it’s not necessarily a bad thing. Aside from
somewhat abstract separations of powers concerns, whether or not it
matters if Congress’s goal of patent law uniformity is undermined depends
immensely on the value of uniformity and the extent to which a uniform
patent law differs from a good patent law. For example, Nard and Duffy
have argued that the Federal Circuit’s decisional law is not only uniform,
but badly flawed, and irretrievably entrenched in the hands of the Federal
Circuit.120 This view may be incorrect based on empirics121 and the
analyses of some,122 but not all,123 commentators. But if Nard and Duffy are
119. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2119–
20 (2013); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1689 (2012); Adam D.
Chandler, Comment, The Solicitor General of the United States: Tenth Justice or Zealous
Advocate?, 121 YALE L.J. 725, 725 (2011).
120. See Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle,
101 NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1627 (2007) (explaining that decentralized decision making can be
uniform, while centralized decision making can “be internally inconsistent”).
121. See, e.g., David L. Schwartz & Lee Petherbridge, Legal Scholarship and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: An Empirical Study of a National Circuit, 26
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1561, 1561 (2011) (reporting that the Federal Circuit uses legal scholarship—a
potential source of information useful for doctrinal innovation—at a rate that appears similar to the
regional circuits); Cotropia, supra note 16, at 801 (“[T]he Federal Circuit does not appear to be a
court of a single-mind, as some commentators have suggested, at least as compared to other circuits.
Rather, there is a good deal of dissent compared to other courts of appeals. This suggests that there
are diverse views among Federal Circuit judges and that these judges are willing to play an active
and vocal role in the law’s development.”). For additional studies showing doctrinal variations, see
supra note 15.
122. See, e.g., S. Jay Plager & Lynne E. Pettigrew, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity
Principle: A Response to Nard and Duffy, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1735 (2007) (criticizing Professors
Nard and Duffy’s argument that the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction over patent litigation
does not promote uniformity and rebutting the professors’ argument that increasing the number of
judges to hear patent cases will not resolve the Federal Circuit’s shortcomings); see also Dreyfuss,
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correct, then the disruption and resetting of the Federal Circuit’s decisional
law that is documented and analyzed in this Article might be viewed as a
very good thing. Of course if patent law already set the standards in the
right places, and induced reliance on the part of many innovators, then
disrupting the law and changing the standards may not be such a good
thing.
Whether patent law is good, in the sense that it sets the right standards
to optimize incentives for innovation is, of course, a topic entirely
different, and potentially much grander than the one addressed by this
Article, which has contented itself with making a novel empirical
contribution and developing new theoretical possibilities. But this Article
at a minimum adds to a growing body of literature that suggests there is
considerable doctrinal variety in Federal Circuit jurisprudence and that
patent law, in the hands of a subject matter-bounded court, may have
access to the tools and influences necessary to keep the law responsive to
changing technological facts and emerging national interests.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit is a response to a failure in judicial administration
that produced a fractured, unworkable patent law that Congress concluded
ill-served entrepreneurship and innovation. The purpose of vesting
exclusive jurisdiction for patent appeals in the Federal Circuit was to
permit that court to develop patent law in the direction of greater clarity
and uniformity. This Article’s central empirical observation is a
remarkable increase in decisional disagreement among Federal Circuit
judges over the past several years, evidence suggesting a substantial
decrease in patent law’s doctrinal uniformity. This Article discusses how
actions taken by Supreme Court and personnel changes at the Federal
Circuit, inter alia, may be cooperating to create disuniformity in patent
law. The findings and discussion shed light on a limitation plaguing current
debates about the Federal Circuit: A lack of knowledge concerning the
extent to which patent law is both uniform, and susceptible to change and
development.

In Search of, supra note 23, at 788 (arguing that “[t]he Federal Circuit . . . has proved to be a
success in many important ways”).
123. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 13, at 9 (arguing to eliminate the Federal Circuit’s exclusive
jurisdiction over patent cases and provide plaintiffs with a choice to file their claims with the
regional circuit courts or the Federal Circuit); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism,
101 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2294774 (arguing “that
empirical progress in patent law depends on greater policy diversity,” not uniformity).
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Appendix A
Field

Field ID

Description

Form

Coding

Kappa

1

Serial

Unique record
identifier
Date issued

A[Integer]

Machine

NA

[Day-Month-Year]

Machine

NA

[month/day/year]

Machine

NA

2

Date

3

Year

4

Origin

Year opinion
issued
Lower tribunal

[Integer]

Machine

NA

5

Case_Name

Full Case title

[Text]

Machine

NA

6

Type

[Precedential |
Nonprecedential]

Machine

NA

7

Appeal_Number

[Integer]-[Integer]

Machine

NA

8

Doc_Type

Precedential or
nonprecedential
status of court
document
Tracking number
assigned by court
Opinion or order

[Opinion | Order]

Human

0.98

9

En_Banc

En banc status

[Yes | No]

Human

10

Judge_1

Name of first
judge on panel

[Text]

Human

[Rare
Event]
0.99

11

Judge_2

Name of second
judge on panel

[Text]

Human

0.99

12

Judge_3

[Text]

Human

0.99

13

Opinion1_Type

[Unanimous |
Majority | Other]

Human

0.93

14

Opinion_1_Author

Name of third
judge on panel
Identifies degree
of agreement
among panel
Author of
majority opinion

[Text]

Human

1.00

15

Opinion2_Type

Identifies degree
of agreement
among panel

Human

0.93

16

Opinion_2_Author

Author of second
opinion, if any

[Concurrence |
Dissent | Both |
Additional Views |
[Blank]]
[Text]

Human

0.96

17

Opinion3_Type

Identifies degree
of agreement
among panel

Human

1.00

18

Opinion_3_Author

Human

19

Notes

Author of third
opinion, if any
Observations
about case

[Concurrence |
Dissent | Both | |
Additional Views |
[Blank]]
[Text]
[Text]

Human

[Rare
Event]
N/A
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